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DICTA

Held.-There is a little evidence to support the referee's
finding of fact, and it was, therefore, error for the District
Court to reverse the award.
Judgment Reversed.

RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
(EDToR's NoTE.-It is intended in each issue of Dicta to note any interestinj decisions of the United States District Court, the Denver District Court, the County
Court, the Juvenile Court, and occasionally the Justice Courts.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT-No.

7858-UnitedStates v.

Broadmoor Hotel Company-J. Foster Symes, Judge.
Facts.-Defendant, at its hotel, gives tea dances which
are open to the public as well as guests. A table d'hote charge
of seventy-five cents is made for tea, which is the uniform
charge throughout the hotel, whether music and dancing are
available or not. Those attending may occupy chairs and
tables but are under no obligation to order refreshments, nor
is there any cover or entrance charge.
The Government alleges the tax prescribed by Sec.
800(a), Subdiv. 6 of the Rev. Act of 1918, approved February 24, 1919, and Sec. 800(a), Subdiv. 5 of the Rev. Act of
1921* is applicable to these facts, and seeks to recover the
tax and penalties for the years 1919 to 1924 inclusive.
Held.-The language of the sections in question imports
something more than the furnishing by the hotel of agreeable surroundings and music by an orchestra, and it is contemplated that the entertainment be conducted for profit and
admission charged. Here the charge of seventy-five cents is
not an excessive one for the tea, and there is no direct profit.
The Sections call for something that might be termed
entertainment, as distinguished from the mere service of food
in the manner and with the accessories customary and expected
by patrons of a hotel of the character of that of defendants.
*These sections are identical and read as follows: "A tax of II2 cents for
each ten cents or fraction thereof of the amount paid for admission to any public
performance for profit at any roof garden, cabaret, or other similar entertainment, to
which the charge for admission is wholly or in part included in the price paid for
refreshment, service or merchandise; the amount paid for such admission to be
deemed to be 20 per centum of the amount paid for refreshment, service and merchandise; such tax to be paid by the person paying for such refreshment, service or
merchandise."
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The term "cabaret" denotes something more in the way of
entertainment than is found in this situation; here no professional dancers or actors were hired by the hotel, and the music
did not include soloists, either instrumental or vocal.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT-No. 5 9 8 5 -In the Matter
of The Colorado Farms Company, Bankrupt-J. Foster
Symes, Judge.
Facts.-On June 30th, 1928, the Referee in Bankruptcy
ordered the sale of 278 parcels of farm lands owned by the
bankrupt to be sold free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, the liens of encumbrancers to attach to the proceeds
to be realized from the sale. The sale was held August 2nd,
and on August 14th an order was entered by the Referee approving the sale of certain of the parcels. Subsequently The
International Trust Company, Trustee, and The Colorado
National Bank, Trustee, each filed petitions for the application of the proceeds of the sales of the real estate in which
they were respectively interested, asking among other things
that the fees of the Trustee and Referee in Bankruptcy,
amounting to a total of 2% of the sale proceeds, be found not
to be a charge against the sale proceeds, but a charge against
the general estate of the bankrupt. The Referee disqualified
himself to hear the petitions insofar- as the fee question was
involved, and referred the question to the Judge of the District Court for decision.
Held.-That the fees and commissions of the Referee and
Trustee in Bankruptcy in connection with the sales mentioned
in the petitions could not be charged against the proceeds of
these sales. The Court did not decide whether these fees
should be a charge against the general estate of the bankrupt.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended in 1903, provided:
Trustees shall receive for their services, payable after they are rendered,
from estates which they have administered such commissions on all
moneys disbursed by them as may be allowed by the courts, not to exceed six
per centum on the first five hundred dollars or less, * * * and one per centum
on moneys in excess of ten thousand dollars.
*

*

*
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This was changed in 1910 to read:
Trustees shall receive for their services, payable after they are rendered,
* •such commissions on all moneys disbursed or turned over to any person,
including lienholders, by them, as may be allowed by the courts, etc.

The commissions allowed to referees are the same as the
commissions allowed to trustees in bankruptcy.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, in In
re Harralson,179 Fed. 490, construing the Bankruptcy Act as
amended in 1903, held that under no circumstances was the
trustee or referee entitled to commissions to be paid from the
proceeds of the sale of encumbered assets, on the theory that
the sale is for the benefit, not of the lienholder, but of the
general estate, and that therefore these commissions should be
paid out of the general estate.
It was decided by the District Court in the present case
that the 1910 amendment, adding the words "or turned over
to any person, including lienholders," did not change the
source of payment of the trustee's and referee's commissions,
but concerned only the amount of the commissions.
100,864-Colorado NationalBank v. Rehbein et al-JudgeHenry Bray.
Facts.-Rehbein, on December 28, 1923, signed a note for
$3,000, payable to Louis Siener in three years and secured by
deed of trust on certain property. Siener pledged the note
with the bank as collateral for a loan of $3,000 to himself. A
few months later Fred Giggals and Edith Giggals bought the
property above from Mrs. Rehbein, the Giggals assuming the
payment of the note and deed of trust. On December 28,
1926, the date of maturity, the Giggals, wishing to pay off the
note, gave a deed of trust for $3,000 to the Capitol Life Insurance Company, which $3,000 was paid to Louis A. Siener, who
gave a forged copy of the note therefor, and also a request for
the release of the deed of trust. This release was executed by
the Public Trustee. The release, and the mortgage to the
Capitol Life Insurance Company, were recorded on the same
day, but the release was by inadvertence recorded five minutes
after the mortgage. On the same day, namely, the date of
maturity, Siener told the bank that the note had been extended
and, with their consent, wrote an extension on the back of the
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note. He had previously endorsed the interest payments as
each became due. Over a year later Siener was arrested for
other crimes and the situation was disclosed. The bank
brought an action to foreclose and for the amount of the note,
against Rehbein, the Giggals and the Insurance Company.
The chief defenses were as follows:
(1) The bank was negligent in allowing Siener to collect interest, endorse payments, extend the note, and endorse
the extension, without the bank notifying the maker that
Siener was no longer holder or inquiring whether the note was
really extended.
(2)
The bank, by the above omissions, was estopped
from denying Siener's agency to collect the principal.
(3)
The note was avoided by a material alteration made
with the bank's consent and without the assent of the maker.
(4) The Capitol Life Insurance Company claimed
that they were purchasers relying upon the release of the deed
of trust by the Public Trustee.
Held.-Judgment in favor of defendants on all points,
particularly on the ground of the bank's negligence.
The Court considered that, although none of the parties
had committed any wrong, the plaintiff bank had placed its
confidence in Siener throughout, whereas the defendants, and
particularly the Giggals, who bought the property and made
payments of interest and were personally present when Siener
received the principal, were not careless or negligent and
should not suffer loss, and that it would be inequitable to set
aside the release obtained by reason of the payment to Siener.
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